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Endgame at Stalingrad: Book One: November 1942 the Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3, by Jonathan M. House
PDF gratuit Endgame at Stalingrad: Book One: November 1942 the Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3, by Jonathan M. House
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Détails sur le produit
Relié: 800 pages
Editeur : University Press of Kansas (14 mars 2014)
Collection : Modern War Studies
Langue : Anglais
ISBN-10: 0700619542
ISBN-13: 978-0700619542
Dimensions du produit:
16,5 x 5,1 x 24,1 cm
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A complex historical event such as Stalingrad battle requires extensive and complex books, painstaking research and analysis from many sources and archival documents. This can be done objectively and thoroughly by experienced authors who can understand the story from ALL perspectives, especially when in the battle were involved more than two opposing parties. This can be viewed as a (moral) responsibility for all authors who attempt to write a superlative book or a “definitive account†of a battle/operation.Never before has a work on this subject been presented so thoroughly from the Eastern front’s expert point of view and its high level would not be reached in the near future. As far as the content goes this tome is NEARLY the definitive thing.There are at least three welcomed threads of information stemming from Endgame at Stalingrad (book 1).The first one is also the most important since it eliminated the historical misconceptions and myths of wildly routing Romanian forces maintained by many authors and nearly every book that described this battle for over 70 years. The authors substantially demonstrated that the vast majority of the Romanian forces held their ground and defended the best they could do, fought against overwhelming odds, had not broken en masse or fled as many authors suggest in some books. Resistance of many units collapsed, due to lack of modern heavy antitank guns, but it was not the retreat en masse! After first day (not mentioned in the book!), there were only two breakthroughs: one in 89th Inf. Regiment sector/ROU 13 Inf. Div. (10-12 km wide and 35 km depth in Kletskaya sector) and one in 13th Inf. Regiment/ROU 14 Inf. Div. (15-18 km wide and 15 km depth in Blinov sector). So, two regiments out of 24 ROU regiments!The shoulders of both penetrations were firmly held until 22-23 Nov. 1942, allowing a successful counterattack, if mounted by 48 Pz. Corps. The disaster was amplified by Soviet tanks in the rear areas since there were no credible reserves to stop them. In the Rzhev area, Soviets tanks (MG Solomatin’s 1st Mech. Corps) penetrated German lines (352 Grenadier Reg./246 Inf Div.-15-20 km wide and 30-40 km depth), but their advance was stopped by German powerful panzer reserves (1, 12, 19, 20 Panzer Divs.).Many previous authors didn’t take into account that when German forces encountered fleeing Romanians soldiers (including here “eagle-eye†H. Rudel), they were seeing many times administrative, logistics or rear area units with minimum training, but also remnants of some front line units. Antonescu spoke many times about German units fleeing and gathered in Morozovsk.The supposedly weak Romanian forces gave actually a far stiffer fight than originally assumed by the Soviet planners. However, to be honest, Marschal Antonescu, in one letter addressed to Manstein, spoke about isolated cases of “lack of resistanceâ€. As authors stated in their book, the Romanians and other allies could perform much better if provided with new equipment from Germany. It was always promised, but remained only on the paper, few arrived and too late (for example, Romanian armies needed 300.000 mines and received 50.000).In my opinion, the most important reasons for the Romanian defeat were: huge frontages (3 ROU Army, 1.5 miles per battalion and 8 miles! per battalion in the 4 ROU Army), very weak AT defense (37/47 mm AT guns and one 75 mm AT battery per division), insufficient panzer reserves (“green†ROU 1 Panzer and incomplete German 22 Panzer divisions able to seal only one penetration on one direction!) and poor supply and logistics (under German command) and lastly, Soviet overwhelmed superiority in all capabilities (personnel, tanks, guns, aircraft), now revealed maybe for the first time at its true extent in valuable tables and ending a persistent controversy and mythology (largely sustained by Soviets!) that the opposing forces were almost equal.Second, this book offers unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives about the genesis of Plan Uranus, competing offensive concepts and the triumph of the “different solutionâ€- broader encirclement of the Sixth Army.Concerning the date/period of Uranus planning, rejecting the overestimate Soviet wisdom, one question still bother me for a long time, even prior to this book: How could the Soviets plan an operation, almost two months before its start, knowing that: 1) the Stalingrad will not fall soon, even in September or October 1942 it was very close to collapse 2) the flanks of the Sixth Army will be defended by Axis allies, thus allowing the “different solution†and 3) these forces have no adequate AT guns and no proper operational tank reserves? Is there something missing from the puzzle? Please note that there were no fewer than eight attempts (offensives) orchestrated by the Red Army to defeat or slow the Axis advance in South Russia, with no relevant gains.Third, this study mention Soviet achievements (four “firsts†on pages 378-379) during this operation (surrounding an entire Axis army, the ability to penetrate Axis tactical defenses, the defeat of the (weak) operational reserves in the operational depth and logistical feats), but also the outright disappointments (among other things, it took five days and not three to complete the encirclement).Fourth, it provided additional information about the successes of the Axis operational reserves in disrupting offensive’s timetable, when properly employed. As Leyser’s 29 Mot. Inf. Div. successful counterattack in South or the mobile defence of the weak 48 Pz. Corps in North demonstrated that the presence of stronger mobile reserves, as in Rzhev area, could thwart any Uranus-style operation.Fifth, as authors showed the sharp and carefully Soviet planning of Uranus Operation didn’t go as smoothly as planned, like a clockwork training exercise, and it took more days to fulfill the mission than anticipated, due to determined defence of the most German and Romanian units.Eventually, the authors claimed that the Germans were caught unprepared to deal the Uranus offensive. The deployment of the 22 Pz Div., the planned deployment from France of the 6 Pz Div., constant Romanian intel reports, additional archival documents in which Antonescu said clearly “we were forewarned about the imminent Bolshevik offensive†are enough examples of measures taken in order to prevent the incoming onslaught. Actually, they had very few measures available to counter any possible offensive.Surely one can read between the lines and see the seeds of my concern and disappointment.With the opening of long-sealed Soviet and other communist countries archives beginning in the 1990s, English-speaking readers have begun to better comprehend the enormity and decisive nature of the fighting between Germany and her Axis allies and the Soviet Union. Despite the huge scale of the fighting and the interest to reveal the truth, much of its history remains hidden (see forgotten battles) and imperfectly understood. This “trilogy†is one of the first sets of its kind to present a history of the Eastern Front that includes up-to-date information culled from long-sealed archives by some of the foremost military historians of the Eastern Front.Like the authors' first two books, this one has also significant archival material from Russian sources. This material is still far from exhausting all that's available in Russian, but it does provide original and new information and the necessary context. This is good thing. Not as good is the apparent depth of research into Romanian archival documents. If you look at the notes in any of the first two books, but also in other books (Slaughterhouse, Red Storm over Balkans, etc), you'll find that most accounts about Romanian forces are sourced to Axworthy et Co, Third Axis, Fourth Ally, proclaimed on page 163 to be, somehow accurately, but still an irksome explanation for such high-caliber historians, “the standard English-language source on Romanian forces in the warâ€. Don't get me wrong; the authors can use whatever sources they believe are relevant and that study is good enough. But, the bottom line for me is that I was expecting more insight research into archives&books for the reason of the importance of the Romanian Army participation in Operation Uranus and follow-on battles.I'm not sure that I emphasize enough the necessity of revealing the whole story from all perspectives and that’s one of my chief reasons why I'm not giving the book five stars. A good book, claimed to be the definitive story of the Battle of Stalingrad, cannot be written without full Romanian perspective of these events. They missed along the way, important aspects such as accurate number of troops surrounded (actually, there were 12.607 Romanians not 20.000, and only 2-3.000 survived the siege), losses (between 19.11.1942-07.01.1943 Romania lost over 158.000 troops or 16 out of 18 divisions, 50% of all armed forces; compare this with Germany losses - 10% of their all armed forces), countless events, ROU air force attacks, equipment, actions, counterattacks or command relationship between Romanian-German HQs - not always friendly, to mention just a few.Let’s force an example Dr. Glantz and Dr. House: How would look the “definitive book†of the Battle of the Bulge only from German and English, Belgian and French villagers’ perspectives?I saw many times reviewers that complained about the Glantz&House style, often tedious, dull or the abundance of the information. Serious students don’t really bother about these aspects and I don’t blame the authors, since I knew their style for years and I can skip some parts, if necessary. However, there is one positive side of this “abundance of informationâ€: no doubt, Glantz&House hit where everybody failed, that is, the Soviet archives. Their access was impressive and they deserve the credit for providing, with whatever cost (it must be a cost/swap when dealing with Soviets!), huge amounts of interesting information. They dig and dived into Russian archives more than anyone else and, I guess, took everything they could digest. I see no other (Western) researcher in the near future with such access, except probably, the Russian historians that are not departing too much from official versions. So, thanks to their dedication, now, the readers and future historians can analyze and select, from their abundant material, the most important parts and expands their achievements.The chronological presentation of the events and actions on both flanks is also the best format to show the operation; even Romanian books/archives use this format, perfectly fit for this situation.I paid a special attention to the failed companion piece to operation Uranus, code-named Mars (pages 79-81). The authors made a sound connection between these events, providing enough elements to judge why one succeeded and the other one failed. But I saw no phrase about the influence of the Allied landings in North Africa (November 8, Operation Torch) or the military occupation of the Vichy France (November 1942, operation Anton). Both were mentioned in Romanian archives as having an important influence on OKW decisions making and added pressure on the possible use of some of the best German tank reserves. The earlier deployment on Eastern Front of the 6 (arrived on 24 November!) and 7 Panzer divisions, not to mention, the three SS Panzergrenadier divisions, might have changed the history!The book has 43 maps – not all ok, a bit more time spent on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. Graphically, the book is a mixed bag. There are some poor, small or simple maps, but also never-seen-before plans or maps. Fortunately, with few exceptions, Romanian archives have the maps and plans of this battle, even the military colored maps dedicated to the battle, so I cannot complain too much. A minor effort to use only the necessary maps would have also avoided some of the reviewers’ observations.Concerning the photos, I must say they are depicting, virtually, all Soviet commanders involved in the operations plus their troops in action; unfortunately, Soviet chiefs of bakery stations and laundry of the three fronts are missing from this selection! No Romanian commanders or troops are shown and just few German generals are presented.The extensive text is complemented by large notes section (56 pages), selected bibliography (German Sixth Army’s Rediscovered Daily Records included) and the usual index.No doubt, this tome is a solid piece of work (it took me five weeks to receive it from UK sibling of Amazon), as the whole “trilogy†and it will stand as a landmark in the Eastern front literature and, in many respects, a model for future researchers. However, for many reasons that could be easily avoided, it will not be the definitive book about Stalingrad.I recommend this book with a 4/5 star rating based on my aforementioned comments and some faults.
This third volume is an ideal extension to the siege and the eventual relief of Stalingrad. Like their earlier volumes, this volume which is formatted in a similar manner is eminently and logically laid out as the battle history of the last half of November is described.In the Preface it is emphasized the amount of research and attention to detail that went into this book, that a small team of experts assisted Glantz and House in making sure the information divulged was the latest available and accurate. Recently released Soviet archival material was used as well as newly discovered German war records. This aspect alone makes this single book important and adds to the overall value of this series. While spending a lot of time discussing the preparations and buildup of Soviet forces for Operation Uranus, the book also looks toward the Germans and discusses key topics like: could 6th Army actually escaped the Cauldron if it really tried, why was von Manstein's relief attempt so half hearted or was Hitler completely to blame for this disaster.In the previous two volumes the Soviets while trying to stay on the offensive were always beaten back to the defensive while this book covers the Soviets as they regain the initiative with the successful running of Operation Uranus that saw the unbelievably quick encirclement of 6th Army. The book ends on November 30th as the encirclement is completed. The next book will describe the clearing of the huge pocket and I suppose von Manstein's attempt to reach Stalingrad. It will also discuss the fighting and the eventual retreat of Army Group A from the Caucasus as well as the early days of the push back of Army Group B and its surviving Allies toward the Donets River.The book opens with a brief summary of conditions and events that led to the Soviet launch of Uranus. The next 100+ pages discusses the many details of the daily planning and preparations of the upcoming operation while at the same time Zhukov tries to expand his bridgehead over the Don River. Soviet war doctrine and Stavka intervention is also squeezed into the narrative.In "Armageddon" and " To the Gates of Stalingrad" you read about the many Soviet attempts to cross the Don and establish a bridgehead on the southern banks of the river. This new volume expands on this foundation by describing the preparations, both tactical and logistical, for the upcoming Operation Uranus while this river fighting is being played out. Between the three books you'll also see how the Germans were weakening their northern defenses by transferring German divisions from the river into the city of Stalingrad. You'll also be reminded that the German position was further weakened by sending Army Group A to the Caucasus. If you haven't read "Armageddon" recently, I would suggest rereading Chapter 8, "The Struggle on the Flanks"; the chapter will enhance your understanding of the immensity of the Soviet effort along the entire front including the fighting in the Caucasus in conjunction with the presentation in this new volume prior to the launch. For that matter Chapters 8 and 9 in "To the Gates of Stalingrad" will also be a good refresher.The next preparatory chapter covers the composition, battle readiness of the troops that would take part in the upcoming battle. By the end of this chapter the reader will have a good understanding of who will be fighting, where the fighting will take place and how vulnerable the Axis forces will be when the launch begins.The battle history begins in mid November and will last until the end of the month. The research and the details of this history are impressive and while information is delivered for both sides, the Soviet history clearly dominates. With the authors spending over 150 pages on the pre-launch history and over 300 pages on Operation Uranus for only a two week period, you can deduce the level of details presented is extraordinary. Operation Uranus is divided into four chapters with the first five days consuming 60% of the coverage. That coverage includes the penetration and routing of the Axis Allies and initial encirclement of 6th Army. The last chapter includes casualties for both sides and a discussion of how the Soviet command and especially Vasilevsky realized that they bagged a much larger force in the cauldron and that additional redeployments and planning would be necessary before the cauldron could be cleared. Von Manstein's relief attempt and the Luftwaffe's replenishment of Stalingrad are lightly covered.Once Operation Uranus begins, the format of each chapter is the same. The chapter begins with the Soviet combat history followed by the Axis reaction and ends with conclusions and analysis. Army units, officers and objectives and action results are covered.To add to the narrative many tables are provided to include other statistics like troop compositions and conditions for different times in the campaign.There are 43 black and white maps and they're comparable to the original maps used in "Armageddon". They're good and do cover the major fighting in the attack areas but I believe creating a few new small area maps from scratch that specifically address points of deployments and penetration would make for a more effective presentation, making it easier to understand. There were times after reading extremely involved passages that a new map drawn to the specifics of that passage would have been very helpful. I know the authors spent a lot of time on the narrative but adding a few more specific maps could have made it easier for the reader to follow some of the more difficult passages. There is also a photo gallery made up of mostly Soviet generals, a couple German officers and a couple battle scenes.Typically with a Glantz / House book, its laden with facts, deployments and movements and it can be a little daunting following the story. Also, the Notes Section is impressive and potentially useful as is the Bibliography, especially if you read Russian for most of the books are Russian with a few German and English books included. The lack of Romanian and Italian sources is noticeable and it appears what coverage there is of these two allies are seen from the Soviet or German viewpoint.I enjoyed this reading and appreciate the hard work of research and the correlation of data gleaned from so many sources but can foresee months of study before I better understand all of its connotations. If you have read Glantz before you have a good idea of what to expect but if Stalingrad is new to you, be forewarned that this not a casual read. So if you like Glantz's earlier works you'll like this; if you have issue's with his earlier efforts, you'll have problems here. To get the most from this book and the series, you'll need to be highly focused and truly interested in combat history. Otherwise you may find it a chore. Highly recommended to all WWII history buffs.
Glantz has some terrific books. He’s quite a guy. He was a military Col. in the US army and also a university professor. Even his YouTube films are excellent. Consider watching some of them.I read book III of Glantz’s Stalingrad series. I highly recommend it.Unfortunately, EndGame at Stalingrad (Book One:1942) was not for me. Essentially it’s about the battles along the Don River and its tributaries. I had deemed it pertained essentially to the actual battle within Stalingrad. In the past I consumed lots about Stalingrad’s outside buildups, numbers in material and men, besides the logistics. Thus, this was not relished.If you’re interested in conflict, war, history and/or peace and hostility, David Glantz has plenty of entertaining studies that are worth purchasing. Another excellent knowledgeable author on WWII is Richard Evens. I would suggest considering buying some of his Amazon studies. Bottom Line: Consider purchasing Glantz’s last study on Stalingrad.
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